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Abstract: The purpose of preimplantation genetic diagnosis by embryonary biopsy is to identify genetic alterations prior to 
the implantation of embryos produced by in vitro fertilization. The most important aim is the selection of genetically healthy 
embryos due to their genetic indemnity, but it can also be used to select the sex or, eventually, other detectable traits accrding 
to the wishes of the parents. This procedure has been the subject of scientific debates, in relation to the harm that it can cause 
to healthy embryos that are going to be implanted, and in relation to the interpretation of the genetic tests made. Ethical 
debates have also focused on the production of and respect for the life and the integrity of developing human beings. In this 
work, it is argued that most of the uses of PGD are morally reprehensible, because they are done with disregard to the dignity 
that should be granted to embryos as human persons. 
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Problemas éticos con el diagnóstico genético preimplantacional de embriones humanos
Resumen: El diagnóstico genético preimplantacional (DGP) mediante biopsia embrionaria tiene como objeto la detección 
de alteraciones genéticas previamente a la implantación de embriones producidos por fertilización in vitro (FIV). Su finalidad 
más significativa es la selección de embriones por su indemnidad genética. También se puede emplear para seleccionar el sexo 
o eventualmente otras características detectadas según el deseo de los padres. Este procedimiento ha sido objeto de debates en 
el ámbito científico, por el eventual daño que puede ocasionar la técnica en embriones sanos que serán implantados y por las 
interpretaciones de los exámenes genéticos realizados. También ha sido objeto de debates en el ámbito ético-antropológico, en 
cuanto a la producción y al respeto a la vida e integridad de los seres humanos en desarrollo. En este trabajo se argumenta que 
los usos que se hacen del DGP son, en su gran mayoría, moralmente reprochables, por hacerse con desprecio de la dignidad 
que debe darse al embrión como persona humana. 
Palabras clave: diagnóstico genético preimplantacional, embriones humanos, estatus ético de los embriones, personas, dignidad
Problemas éticos com diagnóstico pré-implantacional de embriões humanos
Resumo: O Diagnóstico genético pré-implantacional (PGD) por meio de biópsia embrionária visa a identificação de alterações 
genéticas prévias à implantação de embriões produzidos por fertilização in vitro (FIV). Seu propósito mais significativo é a 
seleção de embriões por sua característica genética. Ele também pode ser usado para selecionar o sexo ou, eventualmente, outras 
características identificadas de acordo com os desejos dos pais. Este procedimento tem sido tema de debate em âmbito científico, 
por eventual dano que pode ocaciosionar a técnica em embriões saudáveis que serão implantados e pela interpretações dos 
exames genéricos realizados. Ele também tem sido objeto de debate na área ético-antropológica, no que concerne a produção 
e o respeito à vida e integridade do ser humano em desenvolvimento. Este artigo argumenta que os usos que são feitos do 
PGD são, em sua grande maioria, moralmente condenáveis, por ser instrumentalizado com desrespeito pela dignidade que 
deve ser dada ao embrião como uma pessoa humana.
Palavras-chave: diagnóstico genético pré-implantacional, embriões humanos, status ético dos embriões, pessoas, dignidade
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The development of preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (“PGD” hereon in) has raised nume-
rous ethical issues, which is reflected in policy 
and legal debates around the legitimacy of this 
technique and its limits(1-6). PGD can be used 
to detect genetic diseases in embryos and if its use 
were extended, it could allow for determining if 
an embryo has certain features desired by the pa-
rents, even though these may be related to disea-
ses that require treatment. PGD may have limited 
use in detecting and treating pathologies, but has 
in fact been used as a source of information for 
eliminating defective embryos. One of the appli-
cations of PGD that has received more attention 
from the media and that has been presented as a 
justification for its use is the generation of “sa-
vior babies”, that is, the possibility of choosing a 
child that could be a useful source for transplants 
for a sibling. On the other hand, children that 
do not have favorable characteristics will end up 
frozen and then dead(7). It is obvious that the de-
velopment of these technical possibilities requires 
reflection on their implications. What is in ques-
tion is what children represent for their parents. 
Are they a product or a gift? And if they have a 
genetic flaw, do they lack dignity and deserve to 
be condemned to die? Do parents have the right 
to decide what characteristics their children will 
have? There are important reasons to maintain 
that children cannot be disposable objects like 
consumer products(8-10)3.
These ethical questions are presented in a global 
context of significant differences in the treatment 
of embryos under distinct jurisdictions. Far from 
being a guide in relation to shared moral intui-
tions, legislation has been a source of confusion. 
In effect, although biology has shown beyond 
any doubt that the development of a new human 
being begins with fertilization, legislation in se-
veral countries questions whether the life of an 
embryo prior to implantation is that of a human 
being and whether an embryo deserves respect 
under these conditions(11). Some countries have 
gone further and have even affirmed that respect 
for a human being is conditioned by his/her state 
of development or capacity to completely express 
3 This kind of ethical questioning has become particularly urgent 
with the development of CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing. This work 
does not deal with the problems associated with gene editing, which 
will be the focus of a future work. 
his/her potential. For example, in the European 
Economic Community it is considered that the 
human nature of the embryo is acquired after 
fourteen days of development, given that it is at 
this point that the embryonic nervous system be-
comes evident. This also coincides with the pro-
cess of gastrulation, when conjoined twins can 
be generated. Consequently, in these European 
countries the human embryo is a subject that me-
rits respect from day 14 post-fertilization onward, 
and before which the embryo is an “object” or 
“thing” (referred to as a “pre-embryo”) and conse-
quently susceptible to manipulation. Law 20.120 
(2006) in Chile regulates scientific investigation 
involving human beings and the human genome 
and prohibits cloning. It establishes the respect 
deserving human beings from conception and 
explicitly prohibits the manipulation of embryos. 
Debates continue in other countries about regu-
lating PGD(12,13).
In what follows we will first explain what the 
PGD technique consists of and discuss the risks 
that it implies or could imply for the develop-
ment of the embryo. Secondly, we will argue that 
the embryo should be treated morally as a person 
and thirdly we discuss the implication of this on 
ethical reflections about PGD.  
§ 1. What is preimplantation diagnosis?
The fertilization of an oocyte (egg) by a sperma-
tozoid occurs naturally in the Fallopian tubes and 
results in the formation of a zygote that represents 
the first stage in the development of a new human 
being. The egg nucleus (pronucleus) contains the 
23 maternal chromosomes and the spermatozoid 
contains the 23 paternal chromosomes. Both sets 
of chromosomes have genetic changes (in DNA 
structure) and epigenetic changes (in gene ex-
pression) that are complementary and required to 
biologically generate human beings. The maternal 
mitochondria contribute her DNA to complete 
the genome of the zygote. By successive divisions 
and differentiation the zygote forms all the cell 
types present in human beings. There is no doubt 
that the zygote has a new genetic structure. With 
this the first stage in the development of a new 
human organism begins. It is an ongoing and 
predictable development that ends with the com-
plete development of the organism(14,15). The 
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zygote contains a new genome, the fundamental 
structure of which is maintained throughout its 
development and identifies the unicellular em-
bryo as biologically human and specifies its in-
dividuality(11). The zygote is a totipotential cell 
capable of generating the entire organism.
After the membrane of the spermatozoid fuses 
with the egg, a series of biological events begin that 
lead to the development of the embryo(16,17). 
The genome begins to express itself within a few 
hours of fertilization(18). The first division of the 
zygote occurs around 30 hours after fertilization, 
resulting in the first two cells, which are termed 
blastomeres, each of which has 46 chromosomes. 
The two blastomeres then divide in two and the 
embryonic genome begins to be expressed more 
massively, that is, an epigenome is configured(19). 
At three days post-fertilization the embryo is full 
of cells (blastomeres) and a morula is formed. By 
the fourth or fifth day the embryo grows and pro-
duces a cavity, generating a blastocyst. Cellular 
territories appear in the blastocyst with specific 
functions. Stem cells appear that are responsible 
for producing the distinct cellular tissue of the 
body(20). By day 7 post-fertilization the embryo 
reaches and lodges in the uterus, where hormo-
ne production begins, the detection of which in 
laboratory tests provides the clinical identifica-
tion of pregnancy. This supports the definition of 
pregnancy of the World Health Organization. It 
is important to note that the mother hosts the 
embryo in her body unknowingly seven days 
prior to implantation. There is currently no relia-
ble test to confirm that fertilization has occurred. 
The implanted blastocyst subsequently continues 
developing and gastrulation begin by day 14 to 
16 post-fertilization, which gives rise to the fetal 
organs. Thus the central nervous system begins 
to develop on day 14 and up to day 14 or 16 it 
is possible that the embryo divides and generates 
conjoined twins(21). 
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)(22-
26) was first described by Handyside et al. in a 
1990 issue of Nature(27). The technique involves 
extracting blastomeres by biopsy from embryos 
that are at the two-cell stage to the blastocyst sta-
ge to obtain DNA for genetic molecular analysis 
with microchips that simultaneously analyze the 
DNA in thousands of genes(28). And now the 
same embryo can be re-biopsied(29). The poten-
tial harm that biopsy can cause embryos in early 
stages of development has been assessed and it 
has been shown that biopsies of blastomeres at 
day 3 (in the morula stage) significantly reduces 
subsequent implantation and results in fewer live 
births(30).  
The DNA from a single cell is sufficient to re-
search thousands of genetic mutations responsi-
ble for many genetic disorders(31), for example, 
alterations in just one gene, as in cystic fibrosis, 
in many genes, as in breast cancer, or in chro-
mosomes, as in Down syndrome. It is impor-
tant to consider that finding genetic mutations 
in embryonic DNA does not necessarily mean 
that the disorder will emerge, given that genes 
do not have a predetermined role but rather a 
probabilistic one that requires interaction with 
many other genes and with the environment in 
which the embryo develops(8). In fact, there has 
been a debate recently about the significance of 
findings of genetic variants of clinical uncertain-
ty(32). The absence of any alteration in the genes 
examined by the technique does not ensure that 
the embryo will be healthy given that there may 
be alterations in other genes that were not tested. 
In terms of the degree of risk involved in embr-
yonic biopsy, it cannot be ensured that extracting 
cells does not have harmful consequences for the 
subsequent development of the embryo(33,34). 
With the discovery that the cells of preimplanted 
embryos have a certain orientation in their role 
in the organism(35), concerns have been raised 
as to whether the removal of a cell can result in 
alterations in the embryo’s development or if the 
remaining blastomeres can reprogram themselves 
to compensate for the loss. In this regard, samples 
have been taken from other parts of the embryo 
where biopsy would be potentially less harmful. 
Thus, biopsy of the trophectoderm (structure that 
gives rise to embryonic appendages like the pla-
centa) in the blastocyst state appears to be a safer 
technique(33). Biopsies of polar bodies have also 
been used to explore genetic alterations in embr-
yos(36).
A technical problem that remains unresolved is 
the detection of numeric chromosome altera-
tions (aneuploidy) in only one or two cells of an 
8-cell embryo, while the rest are normal (termed 
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mosaicism) and in particular the final result of a 
pregnancy(37,38). PGD also presents limitations 
in relation to specific genetic diseases such as mi-
tochondrial disorders(39). When a genetic alte-
ration is found in an embryo, it is not implanted 
and most often is eliminated. In some cases the 
embryo is frozen at –180° C and subsequently 
eliminated. In relation to the safety of the tech-
nique, effects on the growth and behavior of ani-
mals born after PGD have been shown(40). Ne-
vertheless, such effects on humans have not been 
observed in preliminary studies(22,41-43). 
One variant of the PGD procedure is preimplan-
tation genetic screening (PGS), which emerged in 
2011 with the introduction of the next-genera-
tion sequencing method, which was used to iden-
tify more than 400 genes associated with recessive 
genetic disorders. This technology is currently 
being used to detect changes in the number of 
chromosomes (aneuploidy) in embryos obtained 
from genetically normal parents by in vitro ferti-
lization(44).
§ 2. Is the embryo morally a person?
Ethical consideration of PGD not only requires 
careful attention to the specifics of the techniques 
that are used and their effect on the development 
of the embryo, but it is also critical clarity as to 
whether or not the embryo is a person. There are 
important differences that turn on this question 
in evaluating the risks involved in PGD. 
A relevant fact for this question is that the human 
organism begins life with fertilization. There is no 
serious doubt that embryo is the same biological 
organism that later becomes a fetus, then a child 
and then an adult person. The question posed by 
several philosophers, however, is whether or not 
we should identify a human person with a human 
organism. The central motivations to differentia-
te between a human being and a biological or-
ganism have arisen at least since John Locke(45, 
II, cap. 27). In the earlier philosophical tradition, 
well represented by Boecio, a person is an indivi-
dual substance of rational nature (rationalis natu-
rae individua substantia; ML 64, 1343). A “subs-
tance” is an entity that exists by itself and does 
not depend on other entities. It continues over 
time and is the same at different moments. Ta-
king into consideration that this substance has a 
rational nature, it is argued that it has an intrinsic 
form of being that, if not impeded, tends to foster 
the rational activity of mature human. A human 
being is typically capable of higher cognitive ac-
tivity and of deliberate and conscious decision-
making. This reflective capacity endows human 
beings with a special moral responsibility for their 
actions and makes them responsible for their mo-
ral character. In their rational and free character, 
persons are endowed with a certain dignity by 
which they should be treated as ends in themsel-
ves (Santo Tomás de Aquino, Summa theologiae, 
I, q. 29, a. 3, c.). However, in the philosophical 
tradition, the morally special character of persons 
is not related to the actual exercise of freedom and 
rationality. One does not exercise these capacities 
when in a deep sleep, nor do small children or, 
of course, embryos. This does not prevent them 
from being persons as we are dealing with the 
same substance that because of its intrinsic nature 
has an internal dynamism destined to give rise to 
freedom and rationality provided this dynamism 
is not in some way impeded4. 
However, this philosophical tradition has chan-
ged profoundly since Locke’s time. For Locke, the 
conditions of identity of a person arise from the 
continuity of psychological states, among which 
memory plays a crucial role(45, II, cap. 27). For 
the psychological view introduced by Locke, 
what makes a person P1 at time t1 the same as P2 
at t2 is the fact that there is continuity between 
the psychological states of P2-at-t2 and P1-at-t1. 
Psychological continuity has preeminence with 
respect to the continuity of the same biological 
organism. What is essential to a person are her/
his mental states, of which the individual is cons-
cious in a first person perspective. What supports 
such mental states is something secondary. The 
question then is whether only one with mental 
4 One can appreciate that the idea has long been maintained that the 
embryo and later the fetus go through a process of “retarded anima-
tion” in which it gradually acquires a human character (cf. Saint 
Thomas Aquinas, Expositio super Iob, III, 395-400). This does not 
cast in doubt the central concept that a person is a substance that 
persists over time, being the same at different moments and possess-
ing a rational nature that tends toward rationality and freedom. It 
is simply that knowledge of the biological process in the past was 
much more limited. The knowledge available today through embry-
ology leaves no doubt that from fertilization onward we are dealing 
with a human organism. 
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states of this type is a person. Only those are indi-
viduals that have a sense of continuing over time 
as a person. It can be appreciated then that there 
are motives of the philosophical tradition present 
in these ideas, but profoundly transformed. For 
the philosophical tradition, a person is one that 
possesses a nature that tends to produce mental 
states of a rational character. In contrast, accor-
ding to Locke’s conception, a person is a set of 
mental states of a rational character. The states 
should be localized in one human organism or 
another, if you will, but this localizing is ultima-
tely accidental. 
During much of the last century the debate 
about personal identity was a continuation and 
refinement of the psychological Lockean concep-
tion(46,47). It isn’t strange that this psychological 
conception of personal identity and of the per-
son has been drawn upon in debates on ethical 
questions. Two philosophers that have taken up 
this point of view very notably are Michael Too-
ley and Peter Singer. For them, only those who 
are conscious of themselves in different moments, 
have interests and are capable of planning for 
their lives in the long-term are persons(48,49). 
For Singer, the fetus does not fall under this cha-
racterization of a person, while many animals 
do. However, very young children and persons 
with highly limited cognitive capacities also do 
not meet this characterization. The same reasons 
for excluding embryos from the condition of a 
person also serve to exclude many other human 
beings that are already born. 
Many find this position excessive, although it 
seems more coherent if one has accepted the 
psychological conception of identity in any of its 
forms. A variety of alternative theories have been 
explored that are less shocking in terms of their 
moral consequences, in which the character of the 
unborn person is acquired between fertilization 
and birth(50:56-90). For example, it has been ar-
gued that the fetus only becomes a person when it 
has conscious desires or interests(51:115-129). It 
has been argued that the fetus becomes a person 
when it has the capacity to feel pain or pleasu-
re. It has also been argued that the fetus becomes 
a human being when it has a functioning brain. 
All these theories are derived from the psycholo-
gical conception, and they partly relaxe the re-
quirements of the Lockean tradition followed by 
Tooley and Singer. Other theories have proposed 
the instant when the fetus becomes viable as the 
critical moment, that is, when it is able to sur-
vive without its mother help. It is clear that we 
do not use a criterion of this type to judge the 
personal character of a seriously ill person, becau-
se of which it be ruled out from hereon. It has 
also been proposed as a criterion the moment in 
which the fetus shows movement or when it beg-
ins having a “human appearance”.  These criteria 
make the character of a person depend on certain 
“recognition” that one can grant to a fetus as an 
“equal”. These criteria can rapidly be ruled out 
given that the character of a person cannot consist 
in an extrinsic property or set of properties5. For 
a long time it was considered that blacks or other 
groups did not appear human. Another criteria 
proposed to fix the moment at which the embr-
yo begins to be a person is implantation. This is 
not a psychological criterion like the former. The 
argument behind this proposal is that before im-
plantation we are not dealing with an authentic 
organism but rather a collection of totipotential 
cells. In effect, the formation of twins can occur 
before implanting. The assumptions on which 
this theory rests have been shown empirically to 
be false(35). It is evident that from the moment 
of fertilization the embryo is an organism. Even 
at the point of the first mitosis there is a certain 
evident degree of specialization of the two cells 
that make up the embryo. 
The conceptions that have rejected that the em-
bryo has the character of a person by one means 
or another involve the psychological theory of 
personal identity. However, this theory has pro-
ven to be disastrous as an explanation of the 
conditions of the identity of a person(52). The 
latest developments in this tradition have been so 
disastrous that they have rejected the notion of 
persons as entities that are identical at different 
moments over time. The fundamental difficulty is 
that psychological continuity is a vague relation-
ship that is given in degrees that can be greater 
or lesser and not one-to-one. In contrast, identi-
ty is a precise one-to-one relationship, reflective, 
symmetric and transitive. One scenario that has 
5 A property F is extrinsic if and only if it is not intrinsic. A property 
F is intrinsic if and only if the fact of x is F or not, where x is any 
object, is founded on parts of x if it is founded on anything. 
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long been considered is the following: suppose 
that the brain of a person, P1, is removed. There 
are cases of persons surviving the destruction of 
one hemisphere of the brain. And suppose that 
a method of brain transplanting has been deve-
loped, so that the right hemisphere of P1‘s brain 
can be transplanted to another person, let’s say P2, 
whose brain had been removed earlier. And the 
left hemisphere of P1‘s brain is transplanted to yet 
another person; let’s say P3, whose brain was also 
removed earlier. It the transplants are successful, 
P2 will be psychologically continuous with P1, and 
P3 will be psychologically continuous with P1. If 
one argues in general terms that personal identi-
ty is based on psychological continuity, then P1 
= P2 and P1 = P3. But identity is symmetric and 
transitive, so that it follows that P2 = P3, which is 
clearly false. 
Psychological continuity is not sufficient for per-
sonal identity, but neither can it be necessary for 
personal identity. Support a person P4 suffers se-
vere brain damage that causes him to lose prac-
tically all his memories. P4‘s beliefs, intentions, 
preferences and character traits change radically 
such that he is psychologically discontinuous 
with pre-injury P4. Wouldn’t it be reasonable that 
we say that post-injury P4 is different from pre-
injury P4? Suppose that after a year, P4 recovers 
his memories, beliefs, preferences, intentions 
and character traits. Wouldn’t it be reasonable to 
argue that P4 had reappeared after a hiatus of a 
year? There are no “intermittent” persons. Conse-
quently, psychological continuity does not appear 
to be necessary for personal identity. 
The alternatives to the classic views of the person 
are not adequate. Our conception of the dignity 
of the person is related to the idea that people are 
substances that are identical at different moments 
over time and have an intrinsic nature that tends 
toward the development of rational thought and 
freedom. In this vision we must concede the cha-
racter of a person to every human individual, and 
the embryo is clearly a human individual. The 
most recent and robust position on personal iden-
tity links this to the identity of the same organism 
over time(53-56). This is exactly what should be 
supposed: a human embryo is the same organism 
that will subsequently be a mature human if its 
development is not impeded. If the mature hu-
man being is a person, then the embryo is as well.
§ 3. Ethical evaluation
According to what has been argued above, an em-
bryo should receive the same treatment as a hu-
man person, although we are dealing with a little 
person that has not yet shown his/her rational ca-
pacities and autonomy. Nor do children o many 
ill persons have these capacities. A dignity should 
be granted to the embryo as an equal to any other 
person. There are two types of consequences that 
this dignity with respect to PGD:
(a) Risk evaluation
Firstly, given that the embryo is a person, the risks 
involved in the application of PGD are risks to 
persons. Normally in our individual and collec-
tive social decisions it is reasonable to assume 
certain risks if they are compensated for by co-
rresponding benefits. Driving a car implies a cer-
tain probability of having an accident. When one 
takes out a term deposit there is a probability that 
the bank will not be able to meet its obligation. 
If these probabilities are low, it is rational to act 
in the face of such risks. When it is a matter of 
activities or processes that imply serious harm to 
persons, it is reasonable to be much more deman-
ding with respect to the risks that are assumed. If 
a treatment is going to be introduced for example, 
it is required that there must be a clear understan-
ding of the risks of using the treatment and its 
therapeutic effectiveness. A doctor that gives his 
patients medicine without knowing the risks that 
medicine poses would be criminal for doing so. 
Ignorance of the effects of a medication does not 
relieve criminal liability. In the case of the use of 
PGD, a lower standard cannot be applied. Igno-
rance of the adverse effects of a technology cer-
tainly does not make its use legitimate. 
As noted above, there are well-founded reasons to 
doubt the safety of PGD. There is evidence with 
animal models that its use can be harmful. Until 
it has been clarified that PGD does not produce 
similar harmful effects in humans its use should 
be prohibited. Trophectoderm biopsy appears to 
offer less risk, but once again ignorance of adver-
se techniques does not make this technique le-
gitimate. The complexity of epigenetic processes 
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obliges extreme caution with any interference in 
the development of the embryo. 
(b) Illegitimate uses 
PGD can simply determine whether or not an 
embryo has any pathology, which in itself is not 
morally questionable. In principle, it is better 
to know something than to be ignorant of it. If 
the use of PGD is for the purpose of applying 
treatment that can restore the health of the embr-
yo, its use is not only legitimate but also morally 
laudable. 
The most serious ethical problem emerges becau-
se the most common use of PGD is to determine 
if the embryo is “appropriate”. The consequence 
of PDG revealing pathology is that the embryo 
is killed or frozen. Both intentionally causing the 
death of embryos and freezing them are seriously 
incorrect actions from a moral perspective. An ac-
tion that in abstract is good or neutral because of 
the type of intent behind it can become wrongful 
if it has been done as a means toward a morally 
wrongful act. Thus if PGD is a means to killing 
embryos its use is morally reprehensible. 
The use of PGD to select other features consi-
dered desirable in embryos is also morally repre-
hensible. It is likewise seriously wrong for parents 
or any other person to intentionally kill a person 
because that person is sick or because, for exam-
ple, that person is not sufficiently intelligent or 
beautiful. 
§ 4. Conclusions
This work has explained what PGD consists of. 
We have argued that the embryo is a person that 
deserves to be treated morally as an equal and not 
as a consumer product to satisfy the preferences 
of parents or anyone else. This imposes significant 
restrictions on the use of PGD. Firstly, its use can 
only be authorized with sufficient knowledge of 
the risks it poses for the embryo. This knowledge 
does not exist at present and there are well-foun-
ded reasons to think that there are serious objec-
tive risks. Secondly, any use of PGD that has the 
end result of intentionally killing embryos that do 
not comply with selected preferences is morally 
reprehensible. Its use for selecting embryos to be 
frozen is also morally reprehensible.
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